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Capital Account Liberalization, the Cost of Capital, and Economic Growth 
Peter Blair Henry* 
Capital account liberalization was once seen as an inevitable step along the path to 
economic development for poor countries.  Liberalizing the capital account, it was said, would 
permit financial resources to flow from capital-abundant countries, where expected returns were 
low, to capital-scarce countries, where expected returns were high.  The flow of resources into 
the liberalizing countries would reduce their cost of capital, increase investment, and raise output 
(Fischer, 1998; Summers, 2000).  The principal policy question was not whether to liberalize the 
capital account, but when— before or after undertaking macroeconomic reforms such as 
inflation stabilization and trade liberalization (McKinnon, 1991).  Or so the story went. 
In recent years intellectual opinion has moved against liberalization.  Financial crises in 
Asia, Russia and Latin America have shifted the focus of the conversation from when countries 
should liberalize to if they should do so at all.  Opponents of the process argue that capital 
account liberalization does not generate greater efficiency.  Instead, liberalization invites 
speculative hot money flows and increases the likelihood of financial crises with no discernible 
positive effects on investment, output, or any other real variable with nontrivial welfare 
implications (Bhagwhati, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz 2002).  
While opinions about capital account liberalization are abundant, facts are relatively 
scarce.  This paper tries to increase the ratio of facts to opinions.  In the late 1980s and early 
1990s a number of developing countries liberalized their stock markets, opening them to foreign 
investors for the first time.  These liberalizations constitute discrete changes in the degree of 
capital account openness, which allow for a positive empirical description of the cost of capital, 
investment, and growth during liberalization episodes. 
Figure 1 previews the central message that the rest of this paper develops in more detail.  
The cost of capital falls when developing countries liberalize the stock market.  Since the cost of 
capital falls, investment should also increase, as profit maximizing firms drive down the 
marginal product of capital to its new lower cost.  Figure 2 is consistent with this prediction.  
Liberalization leads to a sharp increase in the growth rate of the capital stock.  Finally, as a direct 
consequence of growth accounting, the increase in investment should generate a temporary 
increase in the growth rate of output per worker.  Figure 3 confirms that the growth rate of output 
per worker rises in the aftermath of liberalization.   
While the figures do no harm to the efficiency view of capital account liberalization, a 
number of caveats are in order.  For example, it is legitimate to interpret a fall in the dividend 
yield (Figure 1) as a decline in the cost of capital, if there is no change in the expected future 
growth rate of dividends at the time of liberalization.  But stock market liberalizations are usually 
accompanied by other economic reforms that may increase the expected future growth rate of 
output and dividends (Henry, 2000a,b).  Because liberalizations do not occur in isolation, it is 
important to think carefully about how to interpret the data.  Neoclassical theory provides a good 
starting point for framing the issues. 
 
I. Theory 
There are two components to a country’s cost of capital: the risk-free rate and the equity 
premium.  Theory suggests that both will fall when a poor country liberalizes.  The following 
partial equilibrium, mean variance arguments based on Stulz (1999) make the central points most 
succinctly. 
Assume a small country whose equity market is completely segmented from world equity 
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markets.  Also assume that all investors in the world have the same constant relative risk 
aversion and care only about the expected return and variance of their investment.  Let 
[ ]ME R% denote the equilibrium required rate of return on the aggregate domestic stock market 
before liberalization and let fr  denote the domestic risk-free interest rate.  Define the price of 
risk as follows: the aggregate risk premium, [ ]M fE R r−% , divided by the variance of the aggregate 
return on the market, .  Under our assumptions, the price of risk in the small country 
before liberalization is a constant, Τ .  It follows that 
( )MVAR R%
[ ] (M f ME R r Var R= +Τ% )%                                                                                                    (1). 
Now consider what happens to the required rate of return when the country opens its 
stock market to the rest of the world and also allows its residents to invest abroad.  Assume that 
the mean and variance of domestic dividends are unaltered by the liberalization.  Let *[ ]ME R%  
denote the required rate of return on the market after liberalization and let  be the required 
rate of return on the world equity market.  With completely open capital markets, the world risk-
free rate, 
[ WE R% ]
*
fr , becomes the relevant interest rate.  The risk premium on the domestic stock market 
will now depend on the following two factors: (1) the beta of the domestic stock market with the 
world stock market, MWβ , and (2) the world risk premium, *[ ]WE R rf−% .  Following liberalization 
it must be the case that 
* *[ ] ( [ ] *)M f MW W fE R r E R rβ= + −% %
%
                                                                                                     (2). 
Since the liberalizing country is small, adding its stock market to the world market 
portfolio has a negligible effect on the variance (and hence the risk premium) of the world 
market portfolio.  It follows that .  Using this fact, the definition of *( [ ] ) ( )W f WE R r VAR R− = Τ%
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MWβ , and a little bit of algebra, one can show that after liberalization the required rate of return 
on the domestic stock market is given by: 
* *[ ] ( , )M f ME R r Cov R R= +Τ% W% %
]%
                                                                                            (3). 
Subtracting equation (1) from equation (3) gives the difference in the post- and pre-
liberalization required rates of return: 
*[ ] ( ) [ ( , ) ( )M f f M W ME R r r Cov R R Var RΔ = − +Τ −% % %                                                              (4). 
Since poor countries have lower capital-to-labor ratios than rich countries, we would expect that 
*
f fr r> .  Hence the first term on the right-hand side of (4) is negative.  Next, consider the change 
in the equity premium.  For every country in the sample, , the covariance of the 
local market with the world market, is less than 
( , )M WCov R R% %
( )MVar R% , the variance of the local market (Stulz, 
1999).  Hence the second term is also negative.  The central result follows: Liberalization 
reduces the cost of capital. 
 
II.  Evidence 
Identifying liberalization dates is the first step in examining the evidence.  In principle, 
identifying liberalization dates simply involves finding the date on which the government 
declares that foreigners may purchase domestic shares.  In practice, the liberalization process is 
not so transparent.  In many cases, there is no obvious government policy decree to which one 
can point.  When there is no salient liberalization decree, I infer the date on which foreigners 
could first hold domestic shares by determining the first date on which a closed-end country fund 
was established.  Figures 1 through 3 are based on liberalization dates from 18 countries: 
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Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, The Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. 
Stock market liberalizations may seem like a narrow way to define capital account 
liberalization relative to the broader liberalization indicators that are employed elsewhere in the 
literature (Edison, Klein, Ricci and Sloek, 2002).  But it is precisely the narrowness of stock 
market liberalizations that make them more useful for the purpose at hand.  Studies that use 
broad liberalization indicators focus on cross-sectional data, examining the long-run correlation 
between average openness and average investment.  Examining the correlation between average 
openness and investment tells us whether investment rates are permanently higher in countries 
with capital accounts that are more open.  The problem with this approach is that neoclassical 
theory makes no such prediction.   
What the theory does predict is that capital-poor countries will experience a temporary 
increase in investment when they liberalize.  Hence, the relevant issue is not whether countries 
with open capital accounts have higher investment rates, but whether investment increases in the 
immediate aftermath of liberalizations.  The most transparent way of testing the prediction is to 
compare investment rates during liberalization episodes with investment rates during non-
liberalization periods.  Because they constitute a radical shift in the degree of capital account 
openness, stock market liberalizations provide ideal natural experiments for confronting the 
theory with data. 
 
A. Cost of Capital 
Having identified dates on which liberalizations occur, the key question is how to detect 
empirically whether the cost of capital falls.  The cost of capital is the equilibrium-required rate 
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of return on the stock market.  Therefore, if liberalization reduces the cost of capital, we should 
see a one-time revaluation of stock prices when liberalizations occur (Henry, 2000a).  For the 
descriptive exercise here, it is more convenient to use annual dividend yields. 
Again, Figure 1 is consistent with the view that liberalization reduces the cost of capital.  
The figure plots the average aggregate dividend yield across the 18 liberalizing countries in event 
time (year [0] is the year of liberalization).  The average dividend yield falls by roughly 240 
basis points—from an average level of 5.0 percent in the 5 years prior to liberalization to an 
average of 2.6 percent in the five years following liberalization. 
Figure 1 is, of course, also consistent with other interpretations.  Recall that the dividend 
yield equals the required rate of return on equity minus the expected growth rate of dividends: 
[ ]M
D E R g
P
= % −                                                                                                                             (5). 
Section I explains why liberalization reduces [ ]ME R% .  Here, the variable under scrutiny is , the 
expected growth rate of dividends.  If does not change when liberalizations occur, then a fall in 
the dividend yield implies a fall in the cost of capital.  Because liberalizations are part of a 
general process that involves substantial macroeconomic reforms, however, there is a strong 
possibility that they are associated with changes in .  Economic reforms do have significant 
effects on the stock market (Henry, 2002).  But the financial effects of liberalization remain 
statistically and economically significant, after controlling for contemporaneous reforms (Henry 
2000a, Bekaert and Harvey, 2000). 
g
g
g
 
B. Investment 
If liberalizations reduce the cost of capital then we should also see more investment.  
Figure 2 shows that the growth rate of the capital stock rises by 1.1 percentage points in the 
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aftermath of liberalizations— from an average of 5.4 percent per year in the pre-liberalization 
period to an average of 6.5 percent in the post-liberalization period— but Figure 2 is subject to 
the same criticism as Figure 1.  Does investment increase because liberalization reduces the cost 
of capital?  Or, is the entire effect driven by a reform-induced rise in ?  Investment does 
increase following major reforms, but the effect of liberalization on investment remains 
significant, after controlling for reforms (Henry, 2000b). 
g
 
C. Growth 
Since the growth rate of the capital stock increases, the growth rate of output per worker 
should also rise.  Figure 3 confirms that the growth rate of output per worker rises by 2.3 
percentage points— from an average of 1.4 percent per year in the pre-liberalization period to an 
average of 3.7 percent per year in the post-liberalization period.  On the one hand, there is 
nothing surprising about Figure 3.  Whereas Figures 1 and 2 document behavioral responses of 
prices and quantities of capital to liberalization, Figure 3 simply provides a mechanical check of 
the standard growth accounting equation:  
( )ˆˆ ˆ 1Y A K Lα α= + + − ˆ                                                                                                                   (6) 
Where a circumflex over a variable denotes the change in the natural log of that variable.   
The interesting point about Figure 3 is that the increase in the growth rate of output per 
worker is too large to be explained by the increase in investment.  A few simple calculations 
illustrate the point.  The elasticity of output with respect to capital, α , is typically around 0.33.  
So, based on Figure 2, we would expect the growth rate of output per worker in the post-
liberalization period to be about 0.363 (0.33 times 1.1) percentage points higher.  But Figure 3 
displays a 2.3 percentage point increase in the growth rate of output per worker.  All else equal, a 
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1.1 percentage point increase in the growth rate of the capital stock can produce a 2.3 percentage 
point increase in the growth rate of output per worker only if the elasticity of output with respect 
to capital is on the order of 2! 
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2001) find that the increase in growth due to 
liberalization is slightly larger than 1 percentage point after controlling for a number of variables.  
Nevertheless, their finding still requires an elasticity of output with respect to capital that is 
greater than 1.  Their paper does not address the inconsistency of their finding with standard 
production theory.  I do so here. 
The missing piece is, of course, Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth.  Equation (6) 
shows that any increase in the rate of growth of output that is not accounted for by an increase in 
the growth rate of capital and labor must be the result of an increase in , the growth rate of 
technology.  In the current context, it is important to remember that the pure theory of capital 
account liberalization focuses exclusively on capital accumulation.  Technological change and 
TFP growth do not enter into the story.  Therefore, one cannot automatically claim that 
liberalization is also responsible for the increase in TFP growth. 
Aˆ
Now, it is true that if liberalization increases the allocative efficiency of domestic 
investment, it will also raise TFP growth without any need for technological change.  However, 
it is not obvious why capital account liberalization, a policy change directed at increasing 
international allocative efficiency, would have any effect on domestic allocative efficiency 
(Chari and Henry, 2002a; Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2002).  But if theories of capital account 
liberalization cannot explain the increase in TFP growth, what can? 
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III.  Open Questions 
The simplest answer is that the economic reforms, which make it difficult to interpret the 
fall in the dividend yield as a decrease in the cost of capital, are also responsible for the increase 
in TFP growth.  While we typically interpret  as the growth rate of technological progress, any 
economic reform that raises the efficiency of a given stock of capital and labor will also increase 
, even in the absence of technological change.   
Aˆ
Aˆ
The argument is not that capital account liberalization-based theories are utterly 
incapable of explaining increases in TFP growth.  To the contrary, one can tell augmented stories 
in which capital account liberalization does induce technological change.  For example, 
liberalization may ease binding capital constraints, thereby enabling firms to adopt technologies 
that they could not finance prior to the liberalization.  It is also possible that increased risk 
sharing encourages investment in riskier, higher growth technologies in the spirit of Obstfeld 
(1994).   
The point is that the developing countries in this sample may have increased their rate of 
adoption of new production technologies during the late 1980s and early 1990s but, if that is the 
case, it is not immediately apparent from aggregate data (Figures 1 through 3).  In contrast, 
aggregate data are completely consistent with the preponderance of readily observable evidence 
that the countries engaged in substantial economic reform.  Occam’s razor argues for the simple, 
reform-driven explanation of TFP growth over more elaborate capital-account-liberalization- 
based stories.  
Having said that, the only way to completely resolve the issue is to confront it with data 
that are capable of distinguishing between competing theories.  Recent studies of liberalization 
that move from aggregate to firm-level data show the way forward.  For example, Chari and 
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Henry (2002b) provide evidence that liberalization does increase risk sharing.  Examining 
whether the increase in risk sharing induces firms to adopt new production technologies would 
provide a direct test of capital-account-liberalization-based explanations of TFP growth.  
 
IV.  Conclusion 
When developing countries liberalize the stock market, their cost of capital falls, 
investment booms, and the growth rate of output per worker increases.  While the facts cast 
doubt on the view that capital account liberalization brings no real benefits, there are many 
important questions to which the evidence does not speak.  For some of these questions, such as 
do liberalizations cause crises, aggregate data may yet prove useful.  For other questions, 
aggregate data are simply too coarse to provide precise answers.  Moving the technological 
frontier to firm-level data should enhance our general understanding of the process by which the 
effects of liberalization are transmitted to the real economy. 
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Figure 1.  The Cost of Capital Capital Falls When Countries Liberalize the Capital Account.
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Figure 2. Investment Booms When Countries Liberalize the Capital Account .
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Figure 3.  The Growth Rate of Output Per Worker Increases When Countries Liberalize
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